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LEGAL AMBIGUITY, LIABILITY INSURANCE,
AND TORT REFORM
Mark A. Geistfeld*
INTRODUCTION
In a world of uncertainty, mistaken decisions are inevitable.' The
burden of these mistakes must be borne by someone. A liability rule
that required plaintiffs to prove the prima facie case of liability with
certainty, for example, would place the entire burden of uncertainty
on the associated class of rightholders. A liability rule that required
the defendant to negate the prima facie case with certainty, by con-
trast, would place the entire burden of uncertainty on the associated
class of dutyholders. Rather than place the entire burden of uncer-
tainty on either the class of plaintiff rightholders or defendant
dutyholders, tort law has adopted the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard that apportions the burden of mistaken judgments equally
between an innocent defendant and a deserving plaintiff.2 A tort sys-
* Sheila Lubetsky Birnbaum Professor of Civil Litigation, New York University School of
Law. Matthew Walker provided superb research assistance on the insurance underwriting cycle.
This research was supported by a generous grant from the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E.
Greenberg Research Fund of the New York University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., JOHN W. PRATE ET AL., INTRODucriON TO STATISTICAL DE7CISION THEORY 1
(1995) ("When all of the facts bearing on a decision are accurately known beforehand-when
the decision is made 'under certainty'-careless thinking or excessive computational difficulty
are the only reasons why the decision should turn out, after the fact, to have been wrong. But
when the relevant facts are not all known-when the decision is made 'under uncertainty'-it is
impossible to make sure that every decision will turn out to have been right.").
2. See MARK A. GEISTFELDi, TORT LAW: TiHE EssEN1r1ALs 110 (2008).
For example, suppose the plaintiff establishes all the required elements but one. If
the evidence shows there is a 50.1 percent chance that the remaining element is satis-
fied, the plaintiff can recover, despite the 49.9 percent chance that the element is not
actually satisfied. Conversely, if the evidence shows there is a 50.1 percent chance that
the element is not satisfied, the plaintiff cannot recover, despite the 49.9 percent chance
that the element actually is satisfied. As this example illustrates, the ordinary eviden-
tiary standard expressly allows for a 49.9 percent chance that the defendant will be
erroneously subjected to liability (a "false positive") and a 49.9 percent chance that the
plaintiff will be erroneously denied recovery (a "false negative").
By giving equal treatment to false positives and false negatives, tort law has adopted
a norm that gives equal weight or concern to (1) the interest of an innocent defendant
in avoiding liability judgments based on limited factual information (a false positive),
and (2) the interest of a deserving plaintiff who cannot establish his or her right to
compensation only because of limited factual information (a false negative).
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tem that ignored or shunned such uncertainty would be neither fair
nor just.
In addition to factual uncertainty, other types of uncertainty affect
the tort system. For example, even when the facts are not in dispute,
the resolution of a tort case can still be uncertain-it is not always
clear how a tort rule applies to the (undisputed) facts. This legal un-
certainty can be irreducible in the sense that it necessarily exists no
matter how liability rules are formulated; uncertainty may be inherent
in the exercise of legal judgment. Other types of legal uncertainty, by
contrast, can be controlled by the tort system. Some formulations of
liability rules will be more uncertain in application than others. How
should the choice of liability rules be affected by the increased uncer-
tainty and increased burden of mistaken judgments? Regardless of
how one answers this question, it is apparent that uncertainty takes
different forms in tort law, and each may require different treatment
as a matter of fairness or justice.
Even though different forms of uncertainty can have different nor-
mative properties, they are often lumped together for purposes of tort
reform. Legal uncertainty has had disruptive effects on the market for
liability insurance, creating a dynamic in which liability insurers sup-
port tort reform measures that reduce the unpredictability of the lia-
bility costs covered by the insurance policy, making it easier for them
to set premiums. Tort reform can be biased towards reductions of un-
certainty that enhance the predictability of liability insurance, regard-
less of whether the reforms address the problem of uncertainty in a
fair or just manner.
The type of uncertainty targeted by the insurance industry does not
pertain to probabilistic outcomes per se. When the sample of events is
sufficiently large, insurers can rely on established statistical methods
for determining the likelihood or probability of the event in question.3
Having quantified the probability of the event, an insurer can then
rely on other statistical properties to predict with a high degree of
certainty the total number of times that the event will occur within a
large enough pool of independent events (the law of large numbers).
The ability of the insurance industry to handle this form of uncertainty
generates the profits or gains from trade in the insurance transaction.
The type of uncertainty that is problematic for insurance is instead
captured by Frank Knight's renowned distinction between "risk" and
"uncertainty":
Id.
3. See, e.g., PRArr yr AL., supra note 1, at 451-61.
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Risk [is] characterized by the reliability of the estimate of its
probability and therefore the possibility of treating it as an insurable
cost. The reliability of the estimate [comes] from either knowledge
of the theoretical law it obeyed or from stable empirical
regularities ....
True uncertainty is to be "radically distinguished" from calculable
risks: here "there is no valid basis of any kind for classifying in-
stances." Knight believed that uncertainty cannot be explicitly and
exactly defined . . . .4
Whereas individual risky outcomes are governed by the statistical
properties that enable insurers to be confident about expected aggre-
gate outcomes, uncertain events cannot be treated in this manner.
Without reliable estimates of the relevant probabilities, insurers must
use subjective estimates of risk that are prone to forecasting errors
about expected outcomes with the resultant swings in profits and
losses. The insurance industry embraces risk and abhors uncertainty.
"This basic distinction between confident and unconfident
probability judgments goes by many [other] names: risk vs. uncer-
tainty; unambiguous vs. ambiguous probability; precise or sharp vs.
vague probability; epistemic reliability, and so forth. We generally use
the term 'ambiguity,' purely from tradition." 5 Consistent with this ter-
minology, legal ambiguity refers to an unknown outcome regarding
the requirements of a legal rule or body of law, as applied to a set of
known facts, for which the probability cannot be confidently or relia-
bly defined and must be estimated by decision makers. So defined,
legal ambiguity encompasses the uncertain application of tort rules
that can produce forecasting errors with their associated effects on the
profitability of liability insurance.
A full evaluation of uncertainty within tort law must consider how
legal ambiguity affects the market for liability insurance. As ex-
plained in Part II, the rise of mass markets has substantially increased
the legal ambiguity generated by the tort system.6 Part III then dis-
cusses how legal ambiguity increases the cost of capital for insurers
(and therefore premiums) and creates an expectations-driven pricing
structure that is prone to cyclical volatility, including periods of sub-
stantial underwriting losses that disrupt the supply of liability insur-
4. George J. Stigler, Knight, Frank H. Hyneman, in 3 TnE NiEw PALGRAvE: A DicrIONARY
OF1 ECONomics 55, 56 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) (quoting FRANK KNIGH-T, RISK, UNCER-
TAINTY AND PRoITrr 225, 231 (1921)).
5. Colin Camerer, Ambiguity-Aversion and Non-Additive Probability: Experimental Evi-
dence, Models and Applications, in UNCERT-AIN DECISIONS: BRIDGING TIHEORY AND EXPERI-
MuNTs 53, 53-54 (Luigi Luini ed., 1999) (citations omitted).
6. See infra notes 9-36 and accompanying text.
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ance.7 Part IV concludes by illustrating how the insurance cycle has
motivated legislative tort reforms that limit liability in order to reduce
legal ambiguity, regardless of the fairness or justice of such reforms.8
Each of these factors has become increasingly important over the
course of the twentieth century, producing an evolutionary path for
the tort system that is now shaped by the interplay between legal am-
biguity, liability insurance, and legislative tort reform.
II. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, MASS MARKETS, AND THE INCREASE IN
LEGAL AMBIGUITY
As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously observed, "Our law of
torts comes from the old days of isolated, ungeneralized wrongs, as-
saults, slanders, and the like, where the damages might be taken to lie
where they fell by legal judgment."9 Justice Holmes made this obser-
vation at the end of the nineteenth century when courts were consoli-
dating the highly individuated liability rules under the writ system into
a general principle of negligence liability. For much of the twentieth
century, the general principle of negligence liability supplied the nec-
essary justification for eliminating numerous immunities and other
limitations of liability that had been recognized by the early common
law.' 0 The ensuing expansion of liability has made tort law the most
salient and politically controversial component of the civil-justice
system.
Having recognized that "[olur law of torts comes from the old days
of isolated, ungeneralized wrongs," Justice Holmes then observed that
"the torts with which our courts are kept busy to-day are mainly the
incidents of certain well known businesses. They are injuries to per-
son or property by railroads, factories, and the like."" As the econ-
omy expanded throughout the twentieth century, individuals became
increasingly situated in a mass market of some sort. In this context,
7. See infra notes 37-80 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 81-101 and accompanying text.
9. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 467 (1897).
10. See Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpreta-
tion, 15 GA. L. REV. 925, 959-61 (1981) (discussing the numerous limitations of liability in the
writ system that were subsequently eliminated by the growth of negligence liability); Gary T.
Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA.
L. REV. 601, 605-06 (1992) (concluding that judicial tort opinions, until the 1960s, "for the most
part, sharpened and clarified tort doctrines that had been presented somewhat more crudely in
nineteenth-century cases," and that the "vitality of negligence" then caused an expansion of tort
liability lasting until the 1980s); Stephen D. Sugarman, A Century of Change in Personal Injury
Law, 88 CAu-. L. REv. 2403, 2407 (2000) ("The central change in personal injury law doctrine
that has taken place since 1900 is the evolution of a robust law of negligence.").
11. Holmes, supra note 9, at 467.
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the nature of an individual-rights violation is often quite different
from the isolated, ungeneralized wrongs that were redressed by the
early common law. Today, tort liability routinely involves the individ-
ual redress of widespread wrongs in mass markets, the consequences
of which are fully illustrated by the modern regime of strict products
liability.
Like tort law more generally, the growth of products liability has
been predicated on a generalized principle of negligence liability that
did not require any change of the underlying tort right.12 The emer-
gence of mass markets created new conditions requiring new liability
rules. The doctrinal development of strict products liability is well
known but is worth retelling in order to emphasize how mass markets
substantially amplify the effects of legal ambiguity as compared to the
social context in which the early common law developed.
Under the writ system, the duty of product sellers was largely lim-
ited by the contractual relationship. This limitation of duty was finally
demolished by Judge Benjamin Cardozo in the 1916 landmark opinion
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.' 3 In the following years "this deci-
sion swept the country" and "was extended by degrees"14 until it be-
came "in short, a general rule imposing negligence liability upon any
supplier, for remuneration, of any chattel."' 5 The widespread adop-
tion of negligence liability for dangerous products then created a ra-
tionale for strict liability. In the highly influential case Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., Justice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme
Court argued in a concurring opinion that the negligence rule, if prop-
erly applied, would involve insurmountable problems of proof: "An
injured person . . . is not ordinarily in a position to refute [the manu-
facturer's evidence of reasonable care] or identify the cause of the
defect, for he can hardly be familiar with the manufacturing process as
the manufacturer himself is."' 6 This evidentiary problem does not ex-
ist under a rule of strict liability, and so the adoption of that rule
would give product sellers the necessary incentive to distribute nonde-
fective products. Traynor found further support for the rule of strict
liability in the implied warranty of merchantability and the related an-
cient rule that imposed strict liability on the sellers of contaminated
12. See MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODucrs LIABILITY 9-33 (2006) (explaining
how strict products liability can be derived from either the negligence principle or the implied
warranty).
13. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
14. William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YAi L.J. 1099, 1100 (1960).
15. Id. at 1102.
16. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
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food.17 The doctrinal and policy arguments for strict liability were
compelling. In 1963, the California Supreme Court accepted Tray-
nor's argument for strict products liability.18 The rule of strict prod-
ucts liability was then adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts in
1965.19 By 1971, twenty-eight states had adopted the Restatement
(Second) rule of strict liability for product defects; by 1976, forty-one
states had adopted it.20
The growth of products liability has been astounding, with much of
it attributable to issues that had not been extensively considered when
the Restatement (Second) rule of strict products liability was promul-
gated in the 1960s. This liability rule was formulated to deal with
cases in which a defect caused the product to malfunction and injure
the user, such as an exploding bottle of soda.21 By the 1970s, the alle-
gations of defect moved beyond malfunctioning products. Even if the
product functioned according to design, plaintiffs began claiming that
the design itself was defective for not containing a particular safety
feature, like a guard on a machine. Plaintiffs also claimed that prop-
erly designed and manufactured products were defective for not ade-
quately warning consumers about product risks. The claims of design
and warning defects now constitute the bulk of products liability suits.
Allegations of warning defects, for example, are involved in the mas-
sive number of suits involving asbestos liability.22 "From an inauspi-
cious beginning in the late 1960s, asbestos litigation has generated
over 730,000 claims, at an overall cost of at least $70 billion." 23 The
asbestos cases are an extreme example, but they illustrate how the
scope of tort liability far exceeds that which was contemplated when
courts first adopted the rule of strict products liability.
Tort liability could grow in this fashion because of the inherent logic
of a generalized principle of negligence liability. The rule of strict
products liability makes a product seller strictly liable for injuries
caused by a defect in the product. When the product performs as in-
17. See id. at 441-42; see also GuiswIto, supra note 12, at 10-19, 29-33 (showing how the
implied warranty provided a sufficient doctrinal rationale for the rule of strict products liability
and locating that rationale in the difficulty of proving unreasonable care).
18. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900-01 (Cal. 1963).
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOlRs § 402A (1965).
20. GEis-TiELD, supra note 12, at 16.
21. See generally Michael D. Green, The Unappreciated Congruity of the Second and Third
Torts Restatements on Design Defects, 74 BROOK. L. Riev. 807 (2009) (showing that the rule of
strict products liability was initially formulated to deal with the problem of malfunctioning
products).
22. E.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
23. Patrick M. Hanlon & Anne Smetak, Asbestos Changes, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SU4v. AM. L. 525,
526 (2007) (citing STEPIN J. CARROLL ET AL, Asnuisros LIIGATION 71 (2005)).
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tended, the defect cannot be defined by reference to a product mal-
function such as an exploding soda bottle. Absent any malfunction,
what makes a design or warning defective? In addressing this issue,
most courts have concluded that a design or warning is defective if it
creates an unreasonably high risk of physical harm. Under this formu-
lation, the seller continues to be strictly liable for injuries caused by
the defect, defined as the absence of a safety feature (like a protective
guard or a particular safety instruction) that created an unreasonable
risk of harm. The same outcome, though, is obtained under the stan-
dard of reasonable care in a negligence action, which also makes the
seller liable for injuries caused by an unreasonable product risk (the
defect in design or warning). The issue of defective design or warning
accordingly depends on the same finding of unreasonable danger that
is characteristic of negligence liability. 24
This extension of the negligence principle placed tort law in the
center of disputes involving widespread harms. Whereas product
cases initially involved singular accidents caused by an isolated prod-
uct malfunction (like the exploding bottle of soda), the extension of
products liability to encompass product designs and warnings impli-
cates all consumers of the product because each one is exposed to the
risks of the defective design or warning. Like tort law more generally,
products liability no longer is limited to ungeneralized wrongs but
now often redresses the widespread accidental harms that can occur in
mass markets.
In addition to vastly increasing the scope of tort liability, the rise of
mass markets has also made it more difficult for courts to determine
the requirements of reasonable care. The resultant ambiguity in the
negligence rule is then amplified by its widespread impact on the en-
tire product line.
Under the early common law, customary safety practices largely de-
termined the requirements of reasonable care.25 During the twentieth
century, judges concluded that customary safety practices are not nec-
essarily reasonable: "Courts must in the end say what is required;
there are precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard
will not excuse their omission." 2 6 The decline of custom corresponds
with the rise of mass markets. In any market, customs are created by
the safety practices agreed upon by buyers and sellers. To employ the
language of economics, custom is the market equilibrium. By re-
jecting custom, courts effectively concluded that the market equilib-
24. See RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTs LIABILITY § 2 (1998).
25. See, e.g., McClaren v. G.S. Robins & Co., 162 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Mo. 1942).
26. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
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rium can involve the supply of unreasonably dangerous products, an
outcome characteristic of mass product markets.
The problem stems from the difficulty faced by consumers in evalu-
ating product risk. To learn about product risk, the consumer must
expend time and effort to acquire and process the information. In
mass markets, these information costs prevent consumers from being
adequately informed about product risk, yielding customary safety
practices that can be unreasonably dangerous.
As markets have expanded, products have become increasingly
complex. The consumer's purchase decision regarding a single prod-
uct like an automobile can involve a large number of discrete safety
decisions that are simply not worth considering. The benefit of learn-
ing about a 1-in-10,000 risk of being injured by a particular configura-
tion of a car's steering wheel, for example, is likely to be lower than
the cost that the consumer would incur to become informed of the
risk. For such risks, the ordinary consumer would rationally decide to
remain uninformed. 27
Indeed, a consumer who faces significant information costs could
easily decide to forego altogether the evaluation of product risk. Sup-
pose there are two types of consumers. One type is completely unin-
formed of product risk. The other type is well informed, having
incurred the necessary information costs. If there are enough well-
informed buyers in the market, their aggregate demand for product
quality will induce sellers to supply reasonably safe products. 28 The
information held by some consumers can benefit others who are not
well informed of product risk. But since the information is costly to
acquire and process, it would be rational for any consumer to "free
ride" on the informed choices of others. The consumer can get the
benefits of information (safe products) without incurring the informa-
tion costs. Reasoning similarly, other consumers will make the same
choice. "The 'free rider' problem may result in no consumer incurring
the information costs necessary for making decisions about product
safety." 29
The growth of mass markets has predictably caused consumers to
be less informed about product risk. Due to this informational prob-
27. Cf Xavier Gabaix et al., The Allocation of Attention: Theory and Evidence (M.I.T. Dep't
of Econ., Working Paper No. 03-31, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfmabstract-id=444840 (analyzing attention as a scarce resource allocated by cost-benefit
principles and providing empirical support that individuals act in this manner).
28. See generally Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Con-
tract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. Rrv. 1387 (1983).
29. GElS-FiELD, supra note 12, at 48.
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lem, unregulated market transactions predictably produce unreasona-
bly unsafe products, explaining why courts in the twentieth century
rejected customary market practices in favor of an independent stan-
dard of tort liability. A similar social dynamic explains why other
types of customary practices are often unreasonably dangerous, forc-
ing courts to independently determine the standard of reasonable care
in the typical negligence case.30
The standard of reasonable care is notoriously vague.3' For exam-
ple, strict products liability gives consumers and bystanders the right
to receive compensation for their physical harms proximately caused
by a defect in the product sold by the defendant. What constitutes a
defect? The question is easy for cases in which the product malfunc-
tions, but much more difficult when the defect is one of design or
warning. Consequently, courts have adopted ambiguous liability rules
governing product design and warnings.
The appropriate definition of a design defect has long vexed the
courts, with most jurisdictions adopting the risk-utility test.32 The ap-
parent consensus on this issue masks a fundamental indeterminacy.
Based on a national survey, David Owen has reached the following
conclusions about how courts define the risk-utility test:
First, there is no single clearly accepted view as to how the design
defect balancing test should be described or formulated. A related
finding is that there is considerable variation in how the balancing
test is formulated among the states, among decisions within the
same state, and often even within the same judicial opinion. An-
other finding is that courts today quite typically cobble together a
variety of separate and often conflicting formulations of balancing
tests borrowed, without analysis, from earlier opinions. Further,
many courts acknowledge that a variety of factors should be bal-
anced but neither discriminate between the various factors nor ex-
plain how they should be balanced or otherwise interrelate.33
The legal ambiguity is even more severe for product warnings. Af-
ter extensively studying the case law, James A. Henderson, Jr. and
Aaron Twerski, the reporters of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability, concluded that
30. See id. at 215-16 (explaining why the evolution of society from small, close-knit communi-
ties into a highly industrialized global economy means that "custom now narrows the negligence
inquiry in only a few important ways").
31. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1187
(2001).
32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 24, § 2 cmt. d.
33. David G. Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing in Design Defect Cases, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
239, 242 (1997).
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negligence doctrine in the context of failure-to-warn litigation is lit-
tle more than an empty shell. In most cases, the elements of the
warnings cause of action require plaintiffs to do little more than
mouth empty phrases. From the plaintiff's perspective, there is un-
doubtedly a certain attractiveness to a tort without a meaningful
standard of care or any serious requirement of proving causation.
From a broader social perspective, however, such a tort is too law-
less to be fair or useful. 34
The ambiguity in the liability rules governing product designs and
warnings has implications for the entire market, not merely the indi-
vidual case. These liability rules are formulated by reference to the
market as a whole, virtually eliminating any case-specific features
from the safety decision. The reason, yet again, involves the character
of mass markets.
Individual consumers have different preferences for product safety
and other aspects of quality, making it ordinarily infeasible for prod-
uct sellers in a mass market to completely satisfy the preferences of
everyone. Product sellers in mass markets respond to aggregate con-
sumer demand, and so product liability rules are formulated by refer-
ence to the safety expectations of the ordinary or average consumer,
not the particular plaintiff. 35
Because a manufacturer's safety decision depends on the safety
needs of the average or ordinary consumer, the individual tort right of
each consumer in the market is necessarily interrelated. Any particu-
lar rights violation can have categorical effects for similarly situated
rightholders. A single claim seeking recovery for injuries caused by a
defectively designed product, for example, implicates all other identi-
cally designed products in the entire market. One claim can also influ-
ence the litigation decisions of similarly situated consumers, further
influencing the manufacturer's safety decisions with respect to the en-
tire market. 36 Litigation of the individual tort case does not involve
an isolated instance of wrongdoing that was characteristic of the
34. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability:
The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. Riv. 265, 326 (1990).
35. See, e.g., Campbell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 233 n.6 (Cal. 1982) (holding that
under the consumer-expectations test, "the jury considers the expectations of a hypothetical rea-
sonable consumer, rather than those of the particular plaintiff in the case").
36. Mass torts routinely involve defective products. The litigation dynamic for a mass tort
involves a movement from the immature to mature stages. See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS
TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETruMENT 11-28 (2007).
The transition to the mature stage of litigation comes only when the threat to prevail is
such that defendants face a substantial probability of loss in the event of trial. The
usual way to establish the credibility of this threat, not surprisingly, is through actual
plaintiff victories in some early cases.
Id. at 15.
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claims adjudicated by the early common law, but can now affect other
rightholders (consumers) in the mass market. The jury's imposition of
liability in a single case involves conduct directed towards the market
as a whole, creating categorical effects that are not present in the
traditional torts context.
Legal ambiguity, which presumably has always been part of the tort
system, has become increasingly important with the rise of mass mar-
kets. Due to the dynamics of a mass market, custom no longer relia-
bly defines the requirements of reasonable care, forcing courts to
determine reasonable care in more abstract terms with the attendant
ambiguities in application. The resultant ambiguity then has conse-
quences that are amplified by the widespread effects of an individual
tort claim in a mass market. The protection of individual tort rights in
mass markets has led to a marked increase in legal ambiguity.
III. LEGAL AMBIGUITY AND THE SUPPLY OF
LIABILITY INSURANCE
The pricing of liability insurance is fraught with ambiguity. These
policies cover liability risks with probability distributions that are
rarely, if ever, fully known. The resultant ambiguity increases premi-
ums above the level that would attain if the probabilities were fully
known, although the impact of legal ambiguity can be even more per-
nicious. The market for liability insurance experiences an underwrit-
ing cycle that oscillates between "soft markets," in which premiums
are low and coverage is readily available, and "hard markets," in
which premiums are high and coverage is difficult to obtain. The un-
derwriting cycle is produced by forecasting errors that cause insurers
to set premiums that are either too low (soft markets) or too high
(hard markets). Forecasting errors are inevitable when insurers must
make pricing decisions under conditions of ambiguity. By contribut-
ing to forecasting errors, legal ambiguity helps to fuel the underwrit-
ing cycle with the concomitant disruption in the supply of liability
insurance.
A. The Pricing of Liability Insurance
Like any other good or service, the price or premium of a liability
insurance policy must cover the seller's costs while allowing for a nor-
mal profit or rate of return on the underlying investment. Adminis-
trative costs and the like pose no particular problem for the pricing of
these contracts. The difficulty instead pertains to the cost of the legal
liabilities covered by the insurance policy.
2011] 549
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An unknown cost structure is . . . one of the more problematic
elements in determining the price to be charged for insurance.
Most businesses know the costs of goods to be sold, including the
cost of raw materials, processing, selling efforts, and so forth, before
they set the price for the finished product. .. . In contrast, the price
for insurance is based on an assumed cost structure; that is, claims
and expenses must be predicted in setting the rate. Of course, the
operation of the law of large numbers generally gives an insuring
organization much more stability in predicting losses than would be
possible for most insureds individually.37
To address the difficulties posed by the pricing of liability insurance,
the industry has long relied on cooperative action. The Insurance Ser-
vices Office (ISO) collects data from insurers regarding their loss ex-
perience under the standard form ISO Commercial General Liability
(CGL) policy. The pooling of data substantially increases the number
of data points, enabling actuaries to employ established statistical
methods for establishing the likelihood or probability of the liabilities
in question.38 Due to antitrust concerns of price-fixing, the ISO in
1990 stopped preparing advisory premium rates; it now provides in-
surers with "advisory prospective loss costs" that are estimates of fu-
ture loss payments for each line of insurance in each state. 39
The ISO estimates do not fully solve the pricing problem faced by
the individual insurer.
Companies tend to use advisory rates only as a jumping off point
for their own estimates, evaluating how closely the bureau's loss ex-
perience matches their own market niches....
Even when the ISO data are representative of the state as a
whole, each company's underwriting and rate rules are different and
produce a book of business with its own unique risk characteristics.
Thus, an ISO member company would be compelled to evaluate the
relevance of ISO loss experience for its own expected book of
business.40
To determine the appropriate premium or price for its own ex-
pected book of business, a liability insurer must account for various
types of risk, including
(1) "baseline risk", which is the existing risk of loss based on past
experience, assuming no change; (2) "developments risk", which is
37. Hiiuwwr S. DENENBERG 17ET AL., RISK AND INSURANCE 514 (2d ed. 1974).
38. See, e.g., PRA- I-ET AL., supra note 1, at 451-61; see also Gregory Krohm, Implications of
ISO's Change to Loss Cost Filing for Rate Regulation, 8 3. INS. RieaG. 316, 318 (1990) ("The larger
the sample of loss experience analyzed, the more statistically accurate the estimate of future loss
experience will be.").
39. See Krohm, supra note 38, at 316-20 (describing the role of the ISO in setting premiums
prior to 1990 and the reasons for, and changes in, these practices thereafter).
40. Id. at 323-24.
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the risk relating to developments that change the rate or cost of loss
during the insured period; (3) "contract risk", which is the risk relat-
ing to the drafting and interpretation of insurance policies; and (4)
"financing risk", which is the risk relating to changes in investment
performance and the insurance pricing cycle. 41
The type of risk that is directly affected by tort law involves "devel-
opments risk," which is comprised of more highly individuated risks
such as "injury developments risk, injury cost developments risk, stan-
dard of care developments risk, legal developments risk, and claiming
developments risk." 4 2
In forecasting its expected liability costs, an insurer can only draw
limited lessons from its prior loss experience. "Rates based upon past
experience are valid only if the conditions that prevailed in the past
remain unchanged during the period of the contract. Because of eco-
nomic or social changes in liability risks for example, the importance
of trend factors has become very apparent." 43 A trend factor essen-
tially predicts how the insurer's future loss experience under the pol-
icy will diverge from its past history.
To derive an accurate trend factor, the insurer must have good in-
formation about its past experience under the policy. The insurer ac-
quires this information from claims made by policyholders.
"Depending on the kind of insurance, it can take years for insurers to
reach the point when paid claims constitute even half of the loss ex-
penses for the policies sold in a given year." 44 The insurer must deter-
mine the trend factors (to set premiums at which the policies are
presently sold) on the basis of limited data concerning its most recent
loss experience under the policy. More complete data are available
for earlier policy years, but these losses occurred years ago and are
more likely to reflect different risk conditions than those that pres-
ently exist, requiring yet another set of trend factors that account for
these differences.
For these reasons, the premiums for liability insurance are not
based on a known probability distribution (such as a 1-in-100 chance
that the policyholder will incur legal liabilities of $1 million), but in-
stead depend on the insurer's own (subjective) estimates or forecasts
of the risk. The pricing of liability insurance is inherently ambiguous,
requiring insurers to solve a hard predictive problem that is then made
41. Tom Baker, Insuring Liability Risks, 29 Tin GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INS. 128,
128-30 (2004).
42. Id. at 130-31.
43. J. FRANCOIS OuTrvit.u xE, TilEORY AND PRACrICE OF INSURANCE 160 (1998).
44. Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L.
Riv. 393, 398 (2005).
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even more difficult by any ambiguity generated by the tort system
itself.
B. Ambiguity and the Cost of Capital
Under conditions of full information about risk, an investor knows
the parameters that govern the distribution of payoffs or returns of
the various assets. Under conditions of ambiguity, the investor must
estimate these parameters. This parameter uncertainty or "estimation
risk" has predictable implications for asset prices. "An important
strand of recent research in finance contends that uncertainty, in addi-
tion to risk, should matter for asset pricing. When agents are unsure of
the correct probability laws governing the market return, they de-
mand a higher premium in order to hold the market portfolio." 4 5
To see why, suppose that an insurer knows for sure that there is a
10% chance of a loss occurring for an individual policyholder. By re-
lying on the law of large numbers, the insurer can determine (in a
manner quantified by statistical analysis) that a large enough pool of
such policies will, in fact, incur a 10% loss in the aggregate, plus or
minus a small margin for error (say .05%). The margin of error-and
therefore of the insurer's expected returns-is low and statistically
quantifiable under the law of large numbers. Now suppose that the
risk is ambiguous and that the insurer estimates there is a 1/3 chance
that the risk is 5%, a 1/3 chance that the risk is 10%, and a 1/3 chance
that the risk is 15%. The average or expected value of these estimates
is 10%-the true probability-but the insurer now faces substantial
variability in the range of possible outcomes. The law of large num-
bers merely ensures that the actual losses will be within a defined
range (assumed to be .05%) of the actual probability, but the insurer
can only conclude that the actual probability has three different possi-
ble values (5%, 10%, or 15%) with equal likelihood. The range of
expected outcomes now extends from 4.95% (or 5% less .05%) to
15.05% (or 15% plus .05%), a substantial increase compared to when
the risk is not ambiguous (10% plus or minus .05%). An increase in
the variance or dispersion of returns for an investment increases the
cost of capital, all else being equal (such as the average or expected
45. Evan W. Anderson, Eric Ghysels & Jennifer L. Juergens, The Impact of Risk and Uncer-
tainty on Expected Returns, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 233, 234 (2009); see also Larry G. Epstein & Martin
Schneider, Ambiguity and Asset Markets 3-4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 16181, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl6181.pdf (generalizing different
models of ambiguity and finding "[olne common theme ... that ambiguity averse agents choose
more conservative positions, and, in equilibrium, command additional 'ambiguity premia' on
uncertain assets").
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value of the return).46 Increased ambiguity of this type increases the
cost of capital or rate of return required by risk-averse investors.
The problem of ambiguity is even more fundamental, however. In
the prior example, the insurer converted the imprecise probability
into a more general probability framework (the equally likely ex-
pected outcomes of 5%, 10%, and 15%). This approach expresses the
imprecision of risk entirely in terms of risk-the decision maker
merely faces a risk about estimating the risk. But what if the insurer is
unsure of how to select among the three risk estimates? Suppose each
estimate was derived by a different group of actuaries within the com-
pany. Are all groups equally likely to be correct, thereby justifying
the equal weighting given to each estimate as in the prior example?
Does the considerable spread in the risk estimates matter? The lowest
estimate (5%) is half the size of the next smallest estimate (10%) and
one-third the size of the largest estimate (15%). In light of the wide
range of risk estimates, would the insurer be fully confident that the
problem at this point can be adequately solved by the available actua-
rial methods? The lack of such confidence creates model uncertainty,
which further adds to the cost of ambiguity when the decision maker
is ambiguity averse. The insurer, for example, could counteract its
lack of confidence in the estimates by adopting the worst case scena-
rio, thereby estimating the risk at 15%. This ambiguity-averse esti-
mate substantially exceeds the estimate in the prior example (10%
with a high variance) because the insurer "is averse to both risk [as in
the prior example] and model uncertainty."4 7 The cost of ambiguity
can be comprised of risk aversion and aversion to ambiguity itself.
46. See, e.g., Anderson, Ghysels & Juergens, supra note 45, at 233 ("The risk-return trade-off
... states that the expected excess market return should vary positively and proportionally to
market volatility. This relationship is so fundamental that it could well be described as the 'first
law of finance."'). For more extended discussion of the form of ambiguity employed in this
example, including empirical study of how individuals react to changes in the range and expected
value or "center" of the ambiguous decision, see generally Shawn P. Curley & J. Frank Yates,
The Center and Range of the Probability Interval as Factors Affecting Ambiguity Preferences, 36
ORG. BEFIAv. & Hum. DECISION PROCESSES 273 (1985).
47. H. Henry Cao et al., Model Uncertainty, Limited Market Participation, and Asset Prices, 18
Ri-v. FIN. STUD. 1219, 1221 (2005). To be more precise, the prior example utilizes a Bayesian
solution to the problem, which converts uncertainty into a type of risk that is fully accounted for
by measures of risk aversion, leaving no role for model uncertainty.
In the Bayesian approach, when facing model uncertainty, the investor uses a prior
distribution over a set of models. His decision is based on the expected utility evalu-
ated with respect to the predictive distribution. As a result, the investor is neutral with
respect to model uncertainty, although he can be averse to risk. In the Knightian ap-
proach, while the investor may still use von-Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility
when facing risk, he no longer uses a single prior when facing uncertainty. In the multi-
priors expected utility framework . . . an uncertainty-averse investor evaluates an in-
vestment strategy according to the expected utility under the worst case probability
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Consistent with this reasoning, both theoretical and empirical stud-
ies have found that insurance companies increase premiums or with-
draw coverage due to ambiguity or increased difficulties in predicting
the probability of a given loss or the amount of loss for a given
event.48 One recent study involving seventy-eight professional actua-
ries, for example, found that "premiums are significantly higher for
risks when there is ambiguity regarding the probability of the loss." 4 9
Empirical studies have identified the existence of such an "ambiguity
premium" in other contexts as well.50 For example, a recent empirical
study using differences in analyst opinions as a proxy for uncertainty
showed "that assets that are correlated with uncertainty carry a sub-
stantial premium relative to assets that are uncorrelated with our un-
certainty measure."51
Hence there is at least one way in which legal ambiguity increases
the cost of insurance, all else being equal. In general, increased ambi-
guity increases the cost of capital by increasing risk aversion and any
aversion to ambiguity itself. Increased legal ambiguity accordingly in-
creases the "ambiguity premium" that is embedded in the cost of capi-
tal, thereby increasing premiums above the amount that would occur
in the absence of ambiguity. The impact of legal ambiguity on the
market for liability insurance, however, is likely to be even more
costly.
distribution in a set of prior distributions. As a result, the investor is averse to both risk
and model uncertainty.
Id.
48. See Howard Kunreuther & Robin M. Hogarth, How Does Ambiguity Affect Insurance
Decisions?, in CONTRInUTIONs To INSURANCE ECONOMICS 307, 321 (Georges Dionne ed., 1992)
("A principal conclusion emerging from surveys of actuaries and underwriters is that they will
add an ambiguity premium in pricing a given risk whenever there is uncertainty regarding either
the probability or losses."); Howard Kunreuther et al., Insurer Ambiguity and Market Failure, 7
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 71 (1993) (describing studies which found that actuaries, underwriters,
and reinsurers increase premiums when faced with increased ambiguity about the risk of loss);
W. Kip Viscusi, The Risky Business of Insurance Pricing, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 117, 118-20
(1993) (discussing various ways that insurance companies allow risk ambiguity to affect the rate-
setting process).
49. Laure Cabantous, Ambiguity Aversion in the Field of Insurance: Insurers' Attitude to Im-
precise and Conflicting Probability Estimates, 62 THEORY & DECISION 219, 219 (2007).
50. For a survey, see generally Colin Camerer & Martin Weber, Recent Developments in Mod-
eling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 325 (1992).
51. Anderson, Ghysels & Juergens, supra note 45, at 235. "A number of [other studies] find
that more disagreement, as measured by the dispersion of earnings forecasts, implies higher
expected returns." Id. at 234 n.3 (citations omitted).
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C. The Compounding Effect of Forecast Errors
In addition to increasing the variance or range of expected returns
for an insurer, ambiguity will routinely cause insurers to set premiums
that are too high or too low relative to the actual risk. The prior ex-
ample conveniently assumes (for expository purposes) that the insurer
solved the ambiguity problem by correctly estimating the risk on aver-
age (10%), but there is no reason to assume that insurers will ordina-
rily solve the problem in this manner. By definition, ambiguity means
that the insurer does not know the actual probability of the risk in
question and must estimate the probability distribution. The insurer's
estimate can easily be incorrect. The insurer will revise that estimate
based on experience, but it takes liability insurers a number of years
before they can learn the actual risk covered by a policy-a time lag
conventionally called the "tail of a policy." Any revisions based on
incomplete information can be incorrect, resulting in a premium that
is either too high or too low relative to the actual risk.
An insurer's forecasting errors will affect its capital requirements.
As a matter of prudence (and by legal requirement in most in-
stances), the insurer must set "reserves" that are equal to the
amount needed to pay future claims under any policies it sells and
then must set aside assets to offset those reserves. These assets are
real money, which cannot be used for any other purpose other than
earning investment income. Thus, reserves have an immediate ef-
fect on profit and loss.
The reserves for new insurance policies are first posted in a cate-
gory assigned to "incurred but not reported" (IBNR) claims. As
claims come in, claims personnel will transfer reserves from the
IBNR reserves to the "case reserves" they set up for specific claims.
At any given time, the total IBNR and case reserves assigned to a
given set of insurance policies is supposed to constitute the best
judgment of all the future loss expenses to be paid under those poli-
cies. If the case reserves draw down the IBNR reserves more
quickly than anticipated, the insurer is supposed to increase the
IBNR reserves and set aside additional assets to offset those in-
creased IBNR reserves. The assets to offset such "reserve strength-
ening" must come from somewhere, either from assets freed up by
"releases" of reserves from other sets of policies (possibly resulting
in those policies being under-reserved) or from revenue not yet as-
signed to other purposes. 52
Due to the long tail of liability insurance, any forecasting error will
have a compounding effect on the insurer's capital requirements.
The key intuition is that a change in assumptions about loss ex-
penses can affect, not only claims under policies being sold this year,
52. Baker, supra note 44, at 397-98 (footnotes omitted).
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but also claims that are not yet paid under policies sold in the
past.... In long tail lines of insurance, a change in assumptions has
a compounding effect that can lead to a dramatic need for new
reserves and, thus, additional assets to offset those reserves when
the future suddenly looks more expensive than insurers had been
projecting. This compounding effect can create dramatic losses (in
the profit and loss sense) when the future suddenly looks more ex-
pensive than insurers had been projecting, and correspondingly dra-
matic profits when the future suddenly looks less expensive than
insurers had been projecting.53
Forecasting errors can produce substantial alterations in an in-
surer's need for capital. If an insurer underestimates the risk and sets
premiums too low, years will pass before the insurer's claims experi-
ence reveals this mistake. Altering the estimate (via adjustment of the
relevant trend factors) allows the insurer to increase premiums on
new policies, but that alteration also means that the insurer must set
aside new capital reserves for policies that were previously sold (at the
low premium). The insurer's increased need for capital comes at a
particularly costly time. The losses incurred on previously sold poli-
cies reduce the profitability of the insurer and will accordingly in-
crease the cost of capital for this reason alone. The losses also
underscore the magnitude of the ambiguity problem and could in-
crease the "ambiguity premium" embedded in the cost of capital.54
By compounding losses over a number of years, forecasting errors can
substantially increase the cost of capital for insurance companies.
D. The Insurance Underwriting Cycle
Legal ambiguity complicates the forecasting problem faced by in-
surers and increases the likelihood that insurers will make mistakes.
Due to this type of forecasting error, the insurer can set premiums too
low, resulting in underwriting losses over time. These forecasting er-
rors can also produce premiums that are too high, ultimately yielding
supra-normal profits. The dynamics of market competition prevent
premiums from being either systematically too low or too high for
53. Id. at 399-400.
54. This reasoning assumes that the ambiguity premium does not necessarily decrease over
time as insurers gain experience with the estimation problem.
Learning is sometimes invoked to criticize models of ambiguity aversion. The argu-
ment is that since ambiguity is due to a lack of information and is resolved as agents
learn, it is at best a short run phenomenon. Work on learning under ambiguity has
shown that this criticism is misguided. First, ambiguity need not be due only to an
initial lack of information. Instead, it may be generated by hard-to-interpret, ambigu-
ous signals. Second, there are intuitive scenarios where ambiguity does not vanish in
the long run.
Epstein & Schneider, supra note 45, at 22.
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long periods, as insurers would either be driven from business (due to
mounting losses) or forced to reduce premiums to compete with new
entrants enticed by the supra-normal profits in the market. Instead,
premiums cycle between the two types of systematic error, with the
resultant swings in insurer profitability producing an underwriting
cycle:
Markets for many types of property and casualty insurance exhibit
soft-market periods, where premium rates are stable or falling and
coverage is readily available, and subsequent hard-market periods,
where premium rates and insurers' reported profits significantly in-
crease and less coverage is available. Conventional wisdom among
practitioners and other observers is that soft and hard markets oc-
cur in a regular "underwriting cycle." 55
Because the underwriting cycle stems from forecasting errors, there
is widespread agreement that legal ambiguity has a disruptive effect
on the market for liability insurance. 56 As Tom Baker puts it, "uncer-
tainty about insurance costs is the fuel that drives the underwriting
cycle."57 Another study reached a similar conclusion:
A number of studies of the experience with general liability insur-
ance in the mid-1980s argue or provide evidence that the growth in
premiums and lack of availability of insurance were caused largely
by rapid growth in claim cost forecasts, reductions in interest rates
(which increased the present value of predicted claim costs), and
increases in the uncertainty of future liability claim costs associated
with changes in the tort liability system.58
Uncertainty or legal ambiguity is somehow linked to the underwrit-
ing cycle, although the relation between the two has not been fully
identified. As Baker explains,
Thus far, the explanation of "cost" makes it clear that liability
insurance pricing and reserving is an uncertain business and that
seemingly small changes in loss expense assumptions can lead to
large changes in reserving. This uncertainty and reserve com-
pounding alone, however, does not explain the cyclical pattern of
insurance pricing and reserving. All by itself, uncertainty would be
expected to produce a pattern of pricing and reserving that looks
something like the array of darts around a bull's eye, not a pattern
of darts clustered first to the left of the bull's eye and then to the
55. Scott E. Harrington, Tort Liability, Insurance Rates, and the Insurance Cycle, in BROOK-
INGS-WIlARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 2004, at 97, 97 (Robert E. Litan & Richard
Herring eds., 2004).
56. See Scott E. Harrington & Patricia M. Danzon, The Economics of Liability Insurance, in
HANDBOOK OF INSURANCi 277, 297 (Georges Dionne ed., 2000) ("Several studies argue that
greater uncertainty increased prices needed to cover expected future costs including the cost of
capital."); see also Baker, supra note 44, at 393; Harrington, supra note 55, at 97.
57. Baker, supra note 44, at 396.
58. Harrington, supra note 55, at 105-06 (footnotess omitted).
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right. Moreover, the compounding effect that new assumptions have
on reserves should not produce correspondingly compounded
changes in insurance pricing, because prices in a competitive market
should be set at the amount needed to cover future loss expenses,
without regard to insurers' profit and loss under past policies.59
The problem, according to another leading scholar, is that "[w]e
know relatively little about whether and why insurance prices tend to
fall too low during soft markets." 60
The traditional view of underwriting cycles by practitioners and in-
dustry analysts emphasizes fluctuations in capacity to write cover-
age as a result of changes in surplus and insurer expectations of
profitability on new business. Supply expands when expectations of
profits are favorable, but competition then drives prices down, al-
legedly until inevitable underwriting losses deplete surplus. Supply
contracts in response to unfavorable profit expectations and in an
effort to avert financial collapse. Higher prices replenish surplus,
leading to another round of price cutting, which ultimately becomes
excessive. This explanation of supply contracting is roughly consis-
tent with capacity constraint models [that rely on the higher cost of
outside capital relative to internal capital], but the explanation of
soft markets fails to explain how and why competition would cause
rational insurers to cut prices to the point where premiums and an-
ticipated investment income are insufficient to finance optimal fore-
casts of claim costs (and to ensure a low probability of insurer
default).61
There is no widely accepted explanation of the insurance cycle, al-
though there is widespread agreement that ambiguity is at the root of
the problem. Ambiguity requires subjective evaluations of risk and
necessarily means that the insurance market is driven by forecasts and
expectations. Erroneous forecasts alter expectations that in turn
somehow cause the market to cycle.62 Without ambiguity, there
would be no forecast errors or changed expectations, making ambigu-
ity the root cause of the insurance cycle.
E. Ambiguity, Consensus, and the Cycle
Under conditions of ambiguity, an insurer must estimate the risk in
question. There is no identifiably correct or reliable estimate of the
59. Baker, supra note 44, at 401 (footnote omitted).
60. Harrington, supra note 55, at 126.
61. Id. at 119 (footnotes omitted).
62. Despite the obvious role of expectations, the literature on the insurance cycle has not
adequately emphasized that. See, e.g., Gene C. Lai et al., Great (and Not So Great) Expectations:
An Endogenous Economic Explication of Insurance Cycles and Liability Crises, 67 J. RISK & INS.
617, 617-24 (2000) (surveying the literature and proposing that the "elements ... for a consensus
exist" if some previously identified factors were interpreted more generally in terms of "expecta-
tion changes").
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risk (otherwise there would be no ambiguity), nor is there a com-
monly employed approach for estimating ambiguous risks.63 Differ-
ent insurers presumably will make different estimates. Due to
competitive pressures, insurers are likely to revise their initial esti-
mates, with each converging upon a consensus estimate. The policy
will then be available in the market for largely the same premium
from any number of insurers. The market premium, however, is not
necessarily based on the actual risk in question. (If the consensus esti-
mate necessarily operated in this manner, then there would be no
problem of ambiguity-insurers could always eliminate ambiguity by
adopting the consensus estimate.) The market, therefore, can readily
converge on a premium that is too high or too low relative to the
actual risk.
To see why, suppose there are three insurers with each reaching a
different initial estimate of the risk and associated premium for the
policy, respectively denoted low, medium, and high. If the insurers
were required to make a sealed-price bid for procuring business with
the lowest bid garnering the insurance sale, then the winning bidder
would predictably set premiums too low relative to the actual value
(the so-called winner's curse). 64 In our example, all insurance policies
63. Cf. Epstein & Schneider, supra note 45, at 3 ("A confusing aspect of the literature [on
ambiguity] is the plethora of seemingly different models, rarely related to one another, and often
expressed in drastically different formal languages.").
64. Experimental evidence indicates that the winner's curse is a common phenomenon. Rich-
ard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Winner's Curse, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 192 (1988).
The idea is simple. Suppose many oil companies are interested in purchasing the drill-
ing rights to a particular parcel of land. Let's assume that the rights are worth the same
amount to all bidders, that is, the auction is what is called a common value auction.
Further, suppose that each bidding firm obtains an estimate of the value of the rights
from its experts. Assume that the estimates are unbiased, so the mean of the estimates
is equal to the common value of the tract. What is likely to happen in the auction?
Given the difficulty of estimating the amount of oil in a given location, the estimates of
the experts will vary substantially, some far too high and some too low. Even if compa-
nies bid somewhat less than the estimate their expert provided, the firms whose experts
provided high estimates will tend to bid more than the firms whose experts guessed
lower. Indeed, it may occur that the firm that wins the auction will be the one whose
experts provided the highest estimates. If this happens, the winner of the auction is
likely to be a loser. The winner can be said to be "cursed" in one of two ways: (1) the
winning bid exceeds the value of the tract, so the firm loses money; or (2) the value of
the tract is less than the expert's estimate so the winning firm is disappointed. . . . In
either version the winner is unhappy about the outcome, so both definitions seem
appropriate.
Id. A number of scholars believe that the insurance cycle can be explained at least in part by the
winner's curse. See, e.g., Sean M. Fitzpatrick, Fear Is the Key: A Behavioral Guide to Underwrit-
ing Cycles, 10 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 260 (2003) ("[T]he insurance market-particularly in 'long
tail' lines of business-is particularly fertile ground for instances of the Winner's Curse."); Scott
E. Harrington & Patricia M. Danzon, Price Cutting in Liability Insurance Markets, 67 J. Bus.
511, 529-31 (1994) (observing that "heterogeneous information" available to individual insurers
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would sell for the low premium. The market for insurance, however,
does not operate with sealed bids. The typical sale is initiated by a
prospective buyer talking to a broker. These two map out a timeline
and options. The broker collects data from the buyer if necessary and
might perform its own analysis to determine the market. The broker
advises the buyer about the different coverage options and likely
prices. The buyer tentatively decides on a coverage based on the esti-
mates. The broker then "goes to market" and tries to place the risk.
Based on the feedback of the market, the price can be altered. 65 Due
to the nature of the insurance transaction, the insurer that initially
settled on the low premium will learn about the medium and high pre-
miums from its frequent competition over similar policies. This in-
surer also knows the logic of the winner's curse and would rationally
adjust its risk estimate upwards to more closely approximate the con-
sensus estimate. 66 Similarly, the insurer with the high premium will
routinely lose business and could readily conclude that its estimate is
too high, causing it to reduce premiums to more closely approximate
the consensus estimate. Thus, under conditions of ambiguity, insurers
with low premiums have incentives to increase those premiums (to
avoid suffering the winner's curse), while insurers with high premiums
face competitive pressures to reduce premiums. The logic of the win-
ner's curse and price competition is likely to drive premiums towards
some sort of consensus estimate, albeit one that is not necessarily
equal to the actual risk for reasons given earlier.
Numerous studies have found that ambiguous decision making is
conducive to conformity,67 and the insurance market seems prone to
this type of behavior. In addition to the dynamic described above, a
consensus estimate is also attractive to an insurer's actuaries, the indi-
might tend to reduce prices partially because of the winner's curse, but finding that their empiri-
cal research does not support this hypothesis); Robert T. McGee, The Cycle in Property/Casualty
Insurance, FED. RE1s. BANK N.Y. Q. REv., Autumn 1986, at 22, 22 (conjecturing that insurers
with optimistic loss forecasts might cause prices to fall below the level implied by industry aver-
age forecasts); see also Baker, supra note 44, at 421 (concluding that the winner's curse "may
help provide an additional behavioral gloss on the explanations of industry insiders" for the
underwriting cycle).
65. See, e.g., Placing Risks, Li-oYs, http://www.lloyds.com/Lloyds/About-Lloyds/What-we-
do/Placing-Risk (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
66. The effect is in the anticipation of this possibility by each bidder or premium
setter. Each insurer will adjust its own estimates of losses upward, in a market with
information heterogeneity, to account for the fact that, if it is successful in attracting
substantial demand, its premium will likely be too low.
Ralph A. Winter, Comment and Discussion, in BROOKINGS-WHArrON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL.
SERVICIES, supra note 55, at 127, 133.
67. See, e.g., Roger W. Spencer & John H. Huston, Rational Forecasts: On Confirming Ambi-
guity as the Mother of Conformity, 14 J. EcoN. PsyciioL. 697, 708 (1993).
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viduals who estimate or forecast risks and formulate rates for an in-
surer. A rational actuary devises her estimates based on all available
information, which presumably includes the estimates (premiums)
adopted by another insurer.68 Rationality, moreover, is a broader
concept:
Rationality requires the maximization of utility, but forecast accu-
racy is clearly only one element of the forecaster's utility function. If
the researcher's forecast differs widely from that of his/her peers,
the researcher may become somewhat uncomfortable. If the fore-
cast period is lengthy [as occurs with long-tail lines of insurance],
the importance of not appearing out of touch with the prevailing
wisdom may rival or exceed the significance of being unbiased.
An unbiased forecast is not the same as a correct forecast, and if
the forecast period is lengthy, the forecaster will have many more
opportunities to be compared to his/her peers than to be proven
correct. A forecaster who continually deviates from the consensus,
when no actual . . . figure exists [because the actual risk has not yet
been adequately identified], may be harmed from both a status and
pecuniary perspective. Moreover, if unforeseen circumstances cause
virtually all prognosticators to err in the same direction, each can
claim to be blameless and in good company....
Thus, rationality may prevail among forecasters, not in the sense
of bias or efficiency, but in the context of utility maximization in
meeting psychological objectives.69
This type of behavior characterizes the manner in which economic
forecasters make estimates of the inflation rate:
Informational costs and benefits might explain the use of the con-
sensus forecast, but empirical support for that hypothesis is weak
given the relatively poor predictive power of the consensus forecast.
A better explanation for the use of the consensus emerges from psy-
chological principles summarized in the aphorism "ambiguity is the
mother of conformity."
Our empirical results indicate that forecasts of inflation are
strongly correlated with the past forecasts of a consensus or peer
group.70
The dynamic pushing towards a consensus estimate of the insurance
premium is then facilitated by the incentives faced by underwriters,
the individuals who take the general premium rates established by ac-
tuaries and tailor them to the risk characteristics of an individual
insured.
68. A Bayesian decision maker revises probability estimates based on newly acquired infor-
mation, and so such a decision maker could rationally revise her initial estimate (or subjective
prior estimate) in light of the estimates derived by other decision makers confronting the same
estimation problem.
69. Spencer & Huston, supra note 67, at 707.
70. Id. at 708.
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[I]nsurers typically compensate underwriters-that is, the analysts
who determine which risks will be insured and (to varying extents)
what rates will be charged-primarily on the basis of the premiums
they generate (the "top line"), rather than on the ultimate profit-
ability of the books of business they produce (the "bottom line").71
This compensation scheme places undue emphasis on short-run reve-
nue gains (generated by sales of policies) over long-term cost concerns
(the ultimate liabilities incurred under the policy). The incentive to
make sales, therefore, can make underwriters more willing to confront
legal ambiguity by matching or slightly beating the prevailing price in
the market-a price reflecting a consensus estimate of the risk. Not
only does the insurance company itself have an incentive to adopt a
consensus estimate of the risk, its actuaries and underwriters face sim-
ilar incentives. 72
A market premium based on a consensus estimate then has implica-
tions for the dynamics of the market. Suppose that the consensus esti-
mate is originally too high. Over time, insurers will profit in this
market, thereby attracting new entrants and producing competitive
pressures to reduce premiums. Incumbent insurers are also likely to
revise their risk estimates downwards. The period will be one in
which premiums are falling and coverage is readily available, the so-
called soft-market part of the cycle. 73 How far should premiums fall?
An insurer can only answer that question based on its claims experi-
ence, but the long time lag (or tail of the policy) means that errors can
persist and accumulate over time. Premiums can ultimately fall below
the level justified by the actual risk despite insurance laws that at-
tempt to avoid such ruinous competition. 74 At this premium level, in-
surers will experience adverse losses over time, requiring widespread
adjustments in the associated underwriting forecasts with associated
changes in reserves and capital requirements. The additional reserves
require costly capital infusions by insurers, further reducing profitabil-
ity and the availability of assets required for the insurer to take on
71. Fitzpatrick, supra note 64, at 265.
72. See Sholom Feldblum, Underwriting Cycles and Business Strategies, 88 PROC. CASUALTY
ACTUARIAL Soc'Y 175, 175-76, 203-14 (2001) (stressing the importance of underwriters, the fact
that some companies follow market rates rather than make independent determinations, and the
fact that companies are sensitive to competitive pressures to cut rates).
73. Cf Lai et al., supra note 62, at 629 (providing formal model which shows that "when the
insurer perceives that expected losses or risk is decreasing; then availability increases and re-
quired premiums fall").
74. E.g., N.Y. INs. LAw § 2303 (McKinney 2006) ("Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate,
unfairly discriminatory, destructive of competition or detrimental to the solvency of insurers.");
N.Y. INS. LAw § 5505 (McKinney 2009) ("The premiums shall be fixed at the lowest possible
rates consistent with the maintenance of solvency of the association and of reasonable reserves
and surplus therefor.").
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new business.75 The adverse loss experience also underscores the
ongoing problem of ambiguity and could trigger "model uncertainty"
or a loss of confidence in the forecasting models.76 Any increase in
ambiguity will increase the cost of outside capital.77 The supply of
coverage throughout the market begins to shrink, further driving up
prices (in addition to the increases attributable to higher estimates of
future liability costs).7 8 The reduced supply causes buyers to place
primary concern on procuring coverage in the first instance, making
price a secondary competitive concern for insurers.79 Because compe-
tition no longer centers on premiums, insurers can adopt their own
risk estimates that exceed the consensus estimate. The ensuing hard
market of limited supply at high prices substantially increases profits
for insurers, thereby offsetting prior underwriting losses and attracting
new entrants into the market.80 The conditions are now conducive to
competition centered on premiums, and so the cycle begins anew.
This is not a fully specified explanation of the insurance cycle, but it
does show how legal ambiguity has different effects on liability insur-
ance that are somehow linked to the insurance cycle. Legal ambiguity
increases the cost of capital and premiums by increasing the variance
of outcomes that an insurer expects to experience under the policy.
Legal ambiguity can further increase the cost of capital by contribut-
ing to model uncertainty and ambiguity aversion. Finally, legal ambi-
guity can pose the type of forecasting problem that is conducive to
conformity or convergence to a consensus estimate under the appro-
75. Cf Harrington, supra note 55, at 113-17 (explaining why costly external finance and ca-
pacity constraints can explain the onset of hard markets, whereas these models "are somewhat
opaque about price levels in soft markets"); see also INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, BA-
sic CONCEPTS oF ACCOUNTING AN) TAXATION OF PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPA-
NIES 48 (rev. 2d ed. 1987) (describing the legal and practical reasons for why the amount of
insurance that a company can sell-its "capacity"-is a multiple of its capital surplus).
76. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (describing model uncertainty and ambigu-
ity aversion),
77. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text (explaining why increased ambiguity can
increase the cost of capital).
78. Cf Lai et al., supra note 62, at 629 (providing formal model which shows "that when the
insurer experiences events that cause it to change its ex ante expectation of future losses or risk
upward, it will respond by limiting the number of policies written and increasing the premiums
for those it does write").
79. The changing market conditions can alter the buyer's estimation of risk in addition to the
insurer's estimation, thereby shifting the demand curve in a manner that "amplifie[s] rather than
dampen[s] the premium changes." Id. at 634. See also Fitzpatrick, supra note 64, at 270 n.49
(quoting a representative of a major international broker who observed during the recent hard
market in directors and officers (D&O) insurance that "[t]here's no intense competition in terms
of price. We're having difficulty filling out capacity." (alteration in original)).
80. Cf Winter, supra note 66, at 130 ("In all hard markets, revenues have increased as prices
have risen.").
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priate conditions. When the market as a whole is profitable, following
the crowd has its obvious benefits. Competition inevitably places
downward pressure on premiums and can produce a consensus esti-
mate that is too low. Losses will ultimately mount, and following the
crowd is no longer appealing or necessary. Prices rise and supply is
disrupted. Regardless of its exact dynamics, this cycle is driven by
forecasting errors. The pricing of insurance is an inherently subjective
exercise under conditions of ambiguity, creating a role for expecta-
tions that can cause cyclical swings in the market's performance-a
phenomenon that is hardly surprising in light of the recent perform-
ance of global financial markets.
IV. TORT REFORM AND THE DECREASE OF SYSTEMIC
LEGAL AMBIGUITY
"Broad evidence indicates that the modern expansion of tort liabil-
ity has produced ... substantial uncertainty about the frequency and
severity of claims."81 An increase in legal ambiguity will increase the
likelihood that an insurer makes a forecasting error, which can then
be systematized across the market by competitive pressures and pro-
duce the dramatic swings in premiums that define the underwriting
cycle.
The underwriting cycle produced a severe hard market in the mid-
1980s. From 1984 to 1986, premiums for general liability insurance
nearly tripled. 82 Such insurance became unaffordable or unavailable
for some, leading to the so-called liability crisis that appeared in myr-
iad forms such as the closing of day-care centers and municipal swim-
ming pools for reasons related to concerns about uninsured exposure
to tort liability.83 Many factors explain the problem, but as Kenneth
Abraham has concluded, "The most plausible explanation for the size
and suddenness of the premium increases is a decline in the property/
casualty insurance industry's confidence that it could predict the scope
of liabilities it would face under the policies it sold after 1985."84
By the turn of the century, medical liability insurance was exper-
iencing a hard market. According to the U.S. General Accounting
Office, "the greatest contributor to increased premium rates" for
81. Harrington, supra note 55, at 99.
82. General liability premiums rose "from $6.5 billion in 1984 to $19.4 billion in 1986." W.
Kip Viscusi, Product and Occupational Liability, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 71 (1991).
83. See George J. Church, Sorry, Your Policy Is Cancelled, Timi, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16 (describ-
ing the lack of available insurance and the tremendous increases in premiums).
84. Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 Oio S-r. L.J. 399,
405 (1987).
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medical malpractice insurance in the period from 1998 to 2001 in-
volved increasing claim costs and the difficulty faced by insurers in
predicting ultimate losses.8 5
Not surprisingly, the onset of hard markets has precipitated calls for
tort reform:
What is the solution to this mess? The insurance industry and its
institutional insureds urge tort reform, which, for them, means new
laws that curtail what they perceive as the excesses of the tort sys-
tem. Specifically, they propose "reforms" that either (1) pay in-
jured parties less, or (2) make it harder for them to be paid, if at
all.86
Tort reform received its greatest impetus from the hard market of the
1980s. "Of the forty-six states holding legislative sessions [in 1986],
forty-one enacted laws intended to slow the increase in insurance
rates and costs."8 7
This tort reform movement largely completes the story of how tort
law has evolved over the past century. The rise of mass markets has
increased the scope of any legal ambiguity involved in the protection
of the individual tort right. The increased legal ambiguity fuels the
insurance cycle, yielding particular hard markets with substantial in-
creases in premiums and reductions in the availability of coverage.
The occurrence of these hard markets has in turn motivated legislative
tort reform that seeks to limit liability in order to control insurance
costs.
As suggested by this dynamic, the "insurance companies are major
players [within the tort reform movement]. They run advertisements
and public relations campaigns, lobby editorial boards and legisla-
tures, fund judicial and political candidates, and initiate or fight refer-
enda on issues ranging from workers' compensation to limitations on
damages."88
But why would liability insurers want to limit tort liability? In the
extreme, if there were no tort liability, there would be no need for
liability insurance.
85. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACElCE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FAC-
TORs HAVE CONTIRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATEs 4 (2003), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d03702.pdf.
86. Jeffrey O'Connell, Balanced Proposals for Product Liability Reform, 48 0111o ST. L.J. 317,
318 (1987).
87. Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Reform Legislation: Assessing Our
Control of Risks, in Towr LAW AND TIiE PUBIIC INTERRs-T 272, 273 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991);
see also Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law
Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REv. 207, 218-23 (1990) (summarizing tort reform provisions
adopted in forty-eight jurisdictions between 1985 and 1988).
88. JOEL LEVIN, TORT WARS 119 (2008).
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Malpractice insurers supported tort reforms of all sorts, but they put
the most muscle behind the enactment of ceilings on the recovery of
damages, especially for pain and suffering. The insurers' motive in
supporting such ceilings is worth exploring, because this position
may seem contrary to their own interest. After all, limiting the
amount of damages a plaintiff can recover in a lawsuit reduces de-
mand for a liability insurer's product. Why then did insurers sup-
port reforms whose effect would be to reduce their revenue?89
The problem becomes more vexing in light of the substantial reduc-
tions in revenue that presumably follow from the limitation of dam-
ages. Empirical study shows that "the enactment of ceilings on pain
and suffering damages probably had the effect of depressing settle-
ments and judgments to between 15 and 20 percent below the levels
they would otherwise have reached."90 In the long run, the ceilings
would reduce premiums by a somewhat lower amount, a substantial
reduction of expected revenue that makes it difficult to understand
why the insurance industry lobbied for these tort reform measures. 91
As I have previously argued, the reforms furthered the self-interest
of the insurance industry by (1) substantially reducing their costs for
liability policies covering prior years for which the premiums had been
collected but the liability costs not fully incurred and (2) by substan-
tially reducing legal ambiguity in order to reduce the ambiguity costs
inherent in the premium.92 A similar conclusion has been reached by
Kenneth Abraham: "Liability insurers may have viewed the loss of
revenue resulting from placing a ceiling on pain and suffering dam-
ages to be a price worth paying in order to enhance the predictability
of their costs." 9 3
The insurance industry's motivation to reduce legal ambiguity via
the reduction of liability is most evident in its support of caps on pain
and suffering damages, which may be the most vague component of
tort liability.
Jurors have reported that they "find the guidance that is given to
them on how to compute [pain and suffering] damages to be mini-
89. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, TiiE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE ANi) TORT LAW FROM THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 129 (2008).
90. Id. at 128-29 (footnote omitted).
91. "The basic theory of insurance prices implies that 'fair' premiums equal the discounted
value of all expected costs associated with writing coverage including the expected cost of claim
payments, underwriting expenses, income taxes, and capital." Harrington & Danzon, supra note
56, at 291-92. A damage cap, therefore, would substantially reduce the fair premium through
the 15-20% reduction in expected claim costs.
92. See Mark Geistfeld, The Political Economy ofNeocontractual Proposals for Products Lia-
bility Reform, 72 TEX. L. Rpv. 803, 838-40 (1993) (also discussing regulatory constraints that
may have made it difficult for insurers to keep raising premiums to cover rising costs).
93. ABRAHAM, supra note 89, at 129.
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mal. . . ." In one products liability case, jurors said they used a pro-
cess of "guesstimation" to determine pain-and-suffering damages.
Another study found that jurors "used different methods of calcu-
lating the awards."
The vague jury instructions predictably result in highly variable
damage awards. Plaintiffs who suffer more severe injuries tend to
receive higher awards (indicating some degree of "vertical equity"),
but those with similar pain-and-suffering injuries often are awarded
significantly different amounts of damages (indicating a lack of
"horizontal equity"). The jury instructions produce highly variable
damage awards by permitting jurors to rely upon a variety of meth-
ods for calculating pain-and-suffering damages. Different methods
predictably yield different results. One method can easily produce a
damages award twice as great as the amount produced by a differ-
ent method. 94
Reducing the size of pain and suffering awards considerably reduces
the extent to which these uncertain awards can have unpredictable
impacts on the cost structure of liability insurance. The resultant re-
duction of legal ambiguity explains why this reform was favored by
liability insurers.
This conclusion finds further support in the other types of tort re-
forms that have been enacted in the past few decades. "About half
the states now have in force 'statutes of repose' applicable to products
liability," which place specified time limits on the product seller's tort
liability.95 These reforms reduce the length of the "tail" covered by
liability insurance and accordingly make it easier for insurers to pre-
dict their liability costs under these policies.
Another popular reform involves elimination of joint and several
liability, which also simplifies the pricing problem for insurers:
Predicting the magnitude of a particular insured's potential joint
and several liability is particularly difficult for two reasons: whether
an insured will be liable at all and how much damage will occur
hinge partly on the behavior of other parties, and the portion of any
judgment an insured must pay depends on the assets available from
the other defendants. Yet these other parties often will be uniden-
tifiable at the time an insurance pricing decision is made.96
A number of states have also codified existing liability rules, a re-
form that does not reduce liability but nevertheless reduces legal am-
94. Mark A. Geistfeld, Due Process and the Determination of Pain and Suffering Tort Dam-
ages, 55 DEPAUL L. Riv. 331, 341-42 (2006) (second alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
95. ABRAHAM, supra note 89, at 165.
96. Abraham, supra note 84, at 407.
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biguity by preventing courts from further expanding liability through
the exercise of their common law authority.97
The desire to reduce systemic legal ambiguity within the tort system
clearly motivates the tort reform agenda of the insurance industry, but
reforms that exclusively focus on this objective can easily turn out to
be unfair or unjust. Most notably, the inequity of flat damage caps is
both logically apparent and reflected in the empirical data:
A products liability cap . . . will have very targeted impacts. Vic-
tims suffering brain damage, para/quadriplegia, and cancer will be
most affected, while some classes of accidents, such as dermatitis
and poisonings, will be largely unconstrained. To argue that caps
will improve the products liability system is to argue that the very
severe injuries involve the most excessive awards. There is no evi-
dence that this is the case....
Capping awards might increase the degree of inequity in the man-
ner in which pain and suffering awards are set, because victims with
major injuries would be limited in making their claims while those
with minor injuries would be unaffected.98
Based on the inequities produced by flat caps on pain and suffering
damages, some state courts have found them to be in violation of their
state constitutional guarantees. 99
"[T]he justification for eliminating joint and several liability is more
difficult to fathom."100 After all, a defendant subject to joint and sev-
eral liability must have tortiously caused the entirety of the plaintiff's
harm. Why should that defendant's liability be limited at the expense
of the plaintiff? "The substitution of several liability for joint and sev-
eral liability disserves the ends of the tort system: compensation is
inappropriately circumscribed, and deterrence of culpable behavior is
blunted."101
97. E.g., INo. CoDE §§ 34-6-2-29 to 34-20-9-1 (2010) (specifying the rules governing all actions
brought by a user or consumer against a manufacturer or seller for physical harm caused by a
product); LA. Ruv. STAr. ANN. § 9:2800.51-.59 (2009) (same); Omiio REv. CoDE ANN.
§ 2307.71-80 (LexisNexis 2010) (same); Ti~x. Civ. PRAC. & REM. Coo'E ANN. §§ 82.001-008,
90.001-012 (Vernon 2005) (largely the same); WASH. RiV. CoDi § 7.72.010-.070 (2007) (same).
98. W. Kw Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCES LIABIITY 107 (1991).
99. See, e.g., Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1067, 1070-71, 1077 (Ill. 1997)
(concluding that a legislative cap on pain and suffering damages, which was enacted in part to
reduce the "systemic costs" of tort liability and to "ensure the affordability of insurance," vio-
lated the state constitution's prohibition on "special legislation," where "[a] special legislation
challenge generally is judged under the same standards applicable to an equal protection
challenge").
100. William K. Jones, Tort Triad: Slumbering Sentinels, Vicious Assailants, and Victims Vari-
ously Vigilant, 30 HoFsTRA L. RE~v. 253, 258 (2001).
101. Id. at 259.
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The interplay between legal ambiguity, the underwriting cycle, and
tort reform now takes on a new dimension. Increased legal ambiguity
has exacerbated the underwriting cycle that in turn has spawned a tort
reform movement primarily concerned about the reduction of legal
ambiguity, regardless of the justice or fairness of those reforms.
V. CONCLUSION
The problem of an uncertain cost structure is not unique to the in-
surance industry. Volatile input prices, like those produced by the re-
cent oil market, create pricing problems for numerous industries. To
ameliorate the resultant uncertainty, manufacturers simultaneously
use different technologies to produce a homogenous good, which in
turn "reduces the transmission of factor price volatility, like oil-price
shocks, to consumer prices."1 0 2
The uncertain cost structure faced by liability insurers cannot be
addressed by a substitution strategy or one based on the hedging of
risks. The uncertainty is inherent in the insurance contract-the lia-
bility judgments covered by the policy. As the magnitude of that un-
certainty increased in the latter half of the twentieth century, insurers
adopted a different strategy for reducing their inherently uncertain
cost structure: they became major players in the tort reform move-
ment that has sought to limit tort liability through legislative action.
The movement has been successful, and the vast majority of states by
now have legislatively curbed tort liability, with common reforms in-
volving damage caps and the elimination of joint and several liability.
Although different in substance, each reform shares the trait of signifi-
cantly reducing systemic legal ambiguity, which in turn makes it easier
for liability insurers to forecast their expected liabilities under a
policy.
Writing at the height of the insurance crisis in the mid-1980s, Jeffrey
O'Connell identified the problematic nature of the resultant tort re-
form movement:
[A] "solution" that merely further limits the amount of availability
of compensation to injured persons is a questionable solution in-
deed. The least appealing way to reform the tort system is to make it
even harder for injured parties to be paid.
That is not to deny the evils of the present system. ...
102. Frank C. Krysiak, Technological Diversity and Cost Uncertainty, 9 B.E. J. ECON. ANALY-
sis & Pot'y 60, 60 (2009), available at http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol9/issl/art53/
?sending=10966.
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Seeing how wildly complex the tort-liability insurance system is in
being required to determine not only who or what was at fault, but
also the monetary value of nonmonetary losses, we can more appre-
ciate why that system is so unmanageable and why compared with
life, health, or fire insurance, it is so uniquely plagued by delay, un-
certainty, and costly lawsuits. Although high costs and unavailabil-
ity of insurance currently highlight the need for change, the system's
demand for fundamental change exists quite apart from whether,
say, product liability insurance happens to be readily available at a
reasonable price at any given time. 103
The insurance crises sparked by the underwriting cycle are attribu-
table to the legal ambiguity in the tort system, but reforms that simply
fixate on the reduction of legal ambiguity are not the answer. Uncer-
tainty per se is not an evil that must be avoided at all costs by the tort
system. Liability rules that do not accommodate the factual uncer-
tainty inherent in a world of limited information, for example, are un-
likely to be fair or just.10 4 At least some uncertainty is also inherent in
the exercise of legal judgment, including the jury's determination of
reasonable care for important classes of cases.o 5 These forms of am-
biguity can be justified, but that makes little difference when the re-
duction of legal ambiguity is the sole objective of tort reform.
Consequently, some reforms that have reduced legal ambiguity are
unfair or unjust, as illustrated by the widely enacted caps on damages
and the elimination of joint and several liability.
This conclusion does not imply that reform is unnecessary. In prod-
uct cases, for example, the jury's application of the liability rule (the
risk-utility test) is an exercise of cost-benefit analysis that does not
turn on the identification of safety norms in the community. The am-
biguity inherent in a single jury's determination of defective design
can have widespread implications for other cases involving the same
product with the same design, and such ambiguity can have further
adverse effects on both consumer rightholders and manufacturer
dutyholders via its disruptive impact on the market for liability insur-
ance. The ambiguity in these product cases differs from that which is
103. O'Connell, supra note 86, at 318-20.
104. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
105. Compare Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Vir-
tues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1214 (2010) (arguing that the opaque features of liability
standards can have a "salutary impact ... on citizens' moral deliberation and on robust demo-
cratic engagement with law"), with Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A
Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 Micii. L. REV. 2348, 2411 (1990) (arguing "that
tort law enforces community standards of financial responsibility and just compensation" and
defensibly makes the associated "ad hoc, intuitive judgments ... by allowing the jury to evaluate
a wide range of issues and by requiring that it operate in a decisional context that produces
locally objective judgments").
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inherent in a tort case of isolated wrongdoing. The ambiguity inher-
ent in the jury system accordingly has different characteristics across
different types of tort cases, but the tort system so far has paid little
attention to the issue. In the same manner that the tort reform move-
ment can be criticized for ignoring the important differences among
the different forms of legal ambiguity, the same criticism can be lev-
eled at the tort system.
The interplay between legal ambiguity, the underwriting cycle, and
tort reform does not have to produce reforms simply motivated by the
objective of ambiguity reduction. If there is greater sensitivity about
the different types of legal ambiguity, perhaps the tort system will
evolve in a manner that more equitably distributes the burden of un-
certainty between dutyholders and rightholders.
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